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The rallying cry to “end discrimination” is rhetorically powerful, but ultimately empty.
Discrimination is an inevitable and important feature of modern life.  We constantly
discriminate between courses of action, behaviors and beliefs.  It would not just be irrational
to end discrimination, it would be impossible.  What the proponents mean, of course, is that
they wish to end unfair discrimination, or perhaps more accurately put, to end undesirable
discrimination.  This clarification reveals that there is an underlying wrong beyond the mere
fact of discrimination, and it is precisely the character of unfairness that puzzles many courts
and commentators.
This is a familiar lesson in insurance law.  Insurance is premised on pooling a variety
of risks and then segmenting this pool to provide appropriate pricing.  For example, life
insurers promise to pay upon the death of a single individual, but they are able to do so only
because they have thousands of insureds gathered into a large pool that regularizes the risk
into something approaching an actuarial certainty.  The insurers then discriminate among
members of the pool based on factors such as age, whether the applicant smokes, and the
applicant’s medical history.  This is rather unexceptional.  Discrimination makes sense for
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all concerned, because it lessens the risk of adverse selection and promotes fairness in the
setting of policy premiums.  Discrimination is fair to those in the insured pool; a refusal to
discriminate between insureds with regard to premiums probably would be deemed to be
fundamentally unfair.
But there is another side to the notion of “fair actuarial discrimination.”  We know as
a matter of actuarial fact that African-American men have a shorter expected life span than
Caucasian men, and that they have more health problems.  Does this mean that insurers
should charge greater premiums based on race, which can often (although certainly not
always) be an easy “risk factor” to confirm?  It should come as no surprise that the rule in
America is that insurers cannot use race or ethnicity to set premiums, even if doing so can
be justified as a matter of actuarial fact.  The legacy of racial discrimination in the United
States simply is too raw and pervasive to ignore in this context.
Discrimination on the basis of gender is more complex.  An employer that provides
insurance products to employees may not use gender-rated pricing because that would
amount to discrimination against women in the employment setting, but the insurance
industry is permitted to use gender to price its products to the public at large.  Consequently,
it is no violation of employment law statutes for an employer to provide an equal amount of
money to employees to purchase various insurance benefits, even though the price of the
insurance products that they purchase will be based, in part, on the gender of the applicant.
We learn from the insurance context that discrimination can be rational and socially
beneficial, but that society imposes limits on discrimination for policy reasons, even when
the discrimination is motivated by reason rather than animus.
In this paper I will discuss discrimination in the employment setting.  Specifically, I
will discuss how the United States has attempted to address the problem of sexual
harassment.  I believe that the rhetorical underpinnings of this area of law focus on the notion
of “unfair discrimination,” although judges and lawyers find it very difficult to deal with this
fundamental question in a satisfactory manner.  As a means of making my discussion as
concrete as possible, I discuss the adoption by some courts of the “reasonable woman”
standard to assess whether the work environment is so abusive that it amounts to gender
discrimination.  My thesis is that this doctrinal development is an attempt – limited and
undertheorized – to develop the contours of how to determine which discriminatory effects
in the workplace are unfair.
First, I provide a brief overview of the development of the doctrine that a “hostile
work environment” can amount to gender discrimination.  Then, I analyze how some courts
adopted the “reasonable woman” standard for judging whether the hostility is “severe or
pervasive” enough to constitute a violation of civil rights laws, and the issues relating to this
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doctrinal development.  Finally, I discuss the rhetorical dimensions of the “reasonable
woman” standard and assess how the rhetoric reveals the fundamental questions raised by
these cases.
A. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees or applicants “with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”   Title VII2
is the primary civil rights act protecting American workers, although it has been
supplemented by important statutes that have been modeled on its provisions.   Thus, this3
simply-worded ban on discrimination serves as the fountainhead for employment
discrimination laws in the United States.
When read with today’s eyes, the protection of persons from discrimination based on
gender seems unexceptional and is to be expected.  However, the inclusion of “sex” in the
statute was the result of interesting, if not downright bizarre, politics.  While the bill was
being debated in the United States House of Representatives there were numerous attempts
to derail its passage, especially by proposing amendments that would water down its
provisions or would make the bill odious to enough Representatives to preclude its adoption.
The addition of “sex” to the bill at the last minute on motion of Howard Smith, a
conservative Virginia Democrat, is regarded as one of these efforts to derail the bill.  The
liberal supporters of the bill, led by Representative Manny Celler of Massachusetts,
immediately spoke against the amendment for fear that it would weaken support for the bill
among conservative men, but the women Representatives in the House joined with
conservative southern Democrats to adopt the amendment at the last minute of the legislative
process.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist later noted in the first case that recognized hostile work
environment sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII: 
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at
the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110 Cong.Rec.
2577-2584 (1964). The principal argument in opposition to the amendment
 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).4
 This cynical view is not uniformly shared.  Some scholars argue that the addition of “sex” to the statute was5
actually a product of opportunistic hard work by progressive women who turned a defensive maneuver against the
conservatives in their effort to provide equal rights to women.  See Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent
Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW  &  INEQUALITY  163 (1990).    
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).6
 United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).7
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was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different from other types of
discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment. See id.,
at 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States Department
of Labor); id., at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green). This argument was defeated,
the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative
history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination
based on “sex.”4
Read in historical context, the understated observation by the Chief Justice captures the
difficulty at the core of interpreting the statutory provision protecting employees from gender
discrimination: whether it is possible to enforce a principle of anti-discrimination through a
part of the statute that became law only because its proponents hoped that attitudes against
full equal rights for women in the workplace could be galvanized to defeat the Civil Rights
Act!5
The prohibition on gender discrimination is easy to understand when applied to
employers who refuse to hire women for certain jobs, or who hire them on terms different
than those offered to men.  There are difficulties, of course, that the statute recognizes by
providing an exception when there is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”   This exception6
is narrowly construed, as explained by the Supreme Court in a case involving an employer
that excluded fertile women from jobs resulting in exposure to lead in the manufacture of
automobile batteries.  Although motivated by a understandable desire to protect fetuses from
harm, the Court held that the employer had no basis to exclude women from these positions
on the basis of this paternalistic desire, as opposed to factors relating to the woman’s ability
to perform the job itself.  “Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the
parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire
those parents.”7
In addition to overt discrimination with respect to job opportunities, women face
threats of sexual harassment in the workplace that amount to unacceptable “terms” of
 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-910 (11  Cir. 1982).8 th
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employment.  Courts developed the concept of “sexual harassment” to address situations in
which male supervisors demanded sexual behavior from women employees in exchange for
the benefits of employment.  Originally termed “quid pro quo” sexual harassment, and later
construed as sexual harassment leading to “tangible economic loss,” the Court has made clear
that subjecting a woman employee to sexual demands as a requirement for her to receive the
ordinary benefits of employment is a form of gender discrimination for which the employer
is strictly liable.  As explained by one court,
An employer may not require sexual consideration from an employee as a quid
pro quo for job benefits. . . .
. . . .
It necessarily follows from this premise that an employer is strictly
liable for sexual discrimination by supervisors that causes tangible job
detriment.  See Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).  “Discrimination against women is no
less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be
accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful
discrimination.”  H.R.Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.Cong.  & Ad.News 2137, 2141.  Sexual harassment resulting in
tangible job detriment is a form of sex discrimination every bit as deleterious
to the remedial purposes of Title VII as other unlawful employment practices.
We hold that an employer is strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that
amount to sexual discrimination or sexual harassment resulting in tangible job
detriment to the subordinate employee.8
The demand by an employer, through its agent in a supervisory capacity, that a woman
engage in sexual activity in order to obtain or retain the benefits of employment is a clear
case of prohibited sex discrimination.
A much more difficult question arises in connection with more indirect forms of
gender discrimination.  Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender with respect
to compensation, terms and privileges, but the statute also prohibits discrimination with
respect to “conditions.”  This wording opened the possibility that employers must maintain
workplace conditions that are not hostile to employees based on their gender, race or
ethnicity in order to avoid liability for a civil rights violation.  In 1971, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a Latina could maintain a claim for a hostile work environment on the
 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5  Cir. 1971).  The plaintiff alleged that the workplace was hostile because9 th
her employer, an optometrist, segregated patients by race and terminated her for causing “friction” with her white co-
workers who harassed her.  The dispute before the court concerned whether the EEOC could obtain patient records as
part of its investigation of the workplace.
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basis of race for which the employer could be found liable under Title VII.   The court noted9
the expansive statutory language to buttress its pathbreaking holding:
Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1) provides
that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”  This language evinces a Congressional intention to
define discrimination in the broadest possible terms.  Congress chose neither
to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the
parameter of such nefarious activities.  Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom
by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day
and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become
the injustices of the morrow.  Time was when employment discrimination
tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable events,
manifesting itself, for example, in an employer’s practices of hiring, firing, and
promoting.  But today employment discrimination is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon, as the nuances and subtleties of discriminatory
employment practices are no longer confined to bread and butter issues.  As
wages and hours of employment take subordinate roles in management-labor
relationships, the modern employee makes ever-increasing demands in the
nature of intangible fringe benefits.  Recognizing the importance of these
benefits, we should neither ignore their need for protection, nor blind ourselves
to their potential misuse.
We must be acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to
effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness,
and humiliation of ethnic discrimination. . . . Furthermore, I regard this broad-
gauged innovation legislation as a charter of principles which are to be
elucidated and explicated by experience, time, and expertise.  Therefore, it is
my belief that employees’ psychological as well as economic fringes are
statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and that the phrase
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” in Section 703 is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of
 Id. at 238.10
 For general discussions of sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination, see THERESA M. BEINER,11
GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORM ULATE SEXUAL HARASSM ENT LAW  (New
York: New York University Press, 2004); MARGARET A. CROUCH , THINKING ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSM ENT: A  GUIDE
FOR THE PERPLEXED (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); SEXUAL HARASSM ENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS (Linda
LeMoncheck and James P. Sterba, Eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); CAROLINE A. FORELL AND DONNA
M. MATTHEW S, A  LAW OF HER OW N: THE REASONABLE WOM AN AS A MEASURE OF MAN  (New York: New York
University Press, 1999).  
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creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.  I do not wish to be interpreted as holding that an employer’s
mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee falls within the proscription of Section 703.  But by
the same token I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory
atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful
employment practice.  One can readily envision working environments so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional
and psychological stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703
of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.10
It pays to pause at this point in my fast-paced historical overview to attend to the
rhetorical framing in this first, and therefore paradigmatically influential, opinion on the road
to defining hostile work environment sexual harassment.  The Court’s careful analysis and
attention to the realities of the workplace opened a new conception of discrimination, one in
which the employer should be held liable for a workplace “polluted” with discriminatory
attitudes and actions that do not amount to the direct action of the employer to deprive an
employee of the tangible benefits of employment.  The court concluded that the broadly
phrased statute invites a dynamic interpretation to deal with changes in society, noting that
reasonable behavior today might be deemed unjust in the future.  In the early days of the
statute it might have been enough to provide members of racial minorities with access to
paying jobs, but the court recognized the growing importance of the emotional and
psychological aspects of a job once the hiring barrier has been overcome.  Finally, the court
acknowledged the difficulty of line-drawing.  It would make no sense to hold employers
strictly liable for a single epithet uttered in the workplace, but at the same time it would make
no sense to tolerate a noxious work environment that undermined the emotional and
psychological stability of employees who are members of racial minorities.
It is precisely these issues that have dominated the development of sexual harassment
law.   Working on the basis of the developing case law on racial harassment, in 1980 the11
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published guidelines that defined
sexual harassment.  The EEOC guidelines provide:
 “Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (Nov.12
10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (2004).
 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).13
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(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.12
Although the guidelines were intended to broaden the definition of sexual harassment to
include circumstances in which the workplace was “intimidating, hostile or offensive,” the
predicate language of the guideline begins by describing the behavior that generally forms
the basis for quid pro quo sexual harassment, namely “sexual advances, and requests for
sexual favors.”  The list of predicate actions extends to “other verbal or physical conduct,”
but this extension is qualified by the phrase “of a sexual nature.”  The clear implication is
that women are discriminated against because men see them as sexual objects (whether
desirable or undesirable) and that it is the introduction of sexual relations into the workplace,
even if not in a stark “quid pro quo” manner, that can poison the work environment.  By 1980
there were many sophisticated analyses of sexism as a structural barrier to equality in the
workplace, and yet the EEOC guidelines reinforced the idea that “sex discrimination” is
“discrimination related in some way to sexual relations between men and women.”
Following these administrative guidelines, lower courts began to recognize that
employers could be held liable for sex discrimination on account of a hostile work
environment under Title VII, culminating in the recognition of this interpretation of Title VII
by the Supreme Court in 1986.   The Vinson case involved extreme facts to which the13
Supreme Court only alluded in its opinion.  The employee alleged that during her first year
of employment she was taken to a restaurant by her supervisor and propositioned, and that
she complied because she feared retaliation.  She alleged that she faced repeated demands
for sex at the bank where she worked, submitted numerous times, was brutally raped on one
occasion, and was harassed and humiliated by constant fondling and ridicule in front of other
employees.  The lower court determined that the sexual contact was not tied to Vinson’s
employment, inasmuch as she admitted that all of her promotions were merited by her
performance, and so there could be no case of quid pro quo sex discrimination.
 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).14
 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  The court reasoned:15
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.  A
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees'
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.  Moreover, even
without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or
pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender,
religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.
. . . .
So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,
Meritor, supra, 477 U.S., at 67 . . . , there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.
Id. at 22.
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The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court should also have considered
the evidence under a “hostile work environment” theory of sexual harassment.  The Court
concluded that for “sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment’.”   In short, even if the plaintiff had not suffered tangible financial harm as14
a result of the harassment with respect to the “terms” of her employment, the harassment
nevertheless constituted a violation of Title VII because it resulted in discrimination on the
basis of sex with respect to her working “conditions.”  Seven years later, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment need not show
severe psychological injury in the absence of tangible economic harm, reinforcing that the
civil rights statute was designed to eliminate hostile work environments rather than just to
compensate workers who suffer bodily or economic injury as a result of the environment.15
With the Supreme Court having clearly established that Title VII outlaws workplaces
that are hostile, intimidating or threatening on account of gender, the lower courts faced the
challenge of articulating the contours of this form of sexual harassment.  The development
of legal doctrine is path-dependent, and so early rhetorical characterizations tend to have a
lasting effect.  Sexual harassment originally was framed in expressly sexual terms: unlike
quid pro quo harassment, the sexual advances did not affect the material terms of the
employment relationship, but sexual desire and/or aggression was the prototypical form of
behavior that was regarded as discriminatory.  This is one legacy of the particular facts of the
Vinson case, in which the predatory sexual behavior of the supervisor obviously produced
an intolerable workplace even if it could not be connected with tangible losses by the
plaintiff with respect to promotion or compensation.
However, the dynamics of the workplace can be sexist and offensive to women even
in the absence of overt sexual predation.  The cases involving harassment based on race or
ethnicity involved situations in which majority employees demonstrated their position of
 Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6  Cir. 1986).16 th
 Id. at 615.17
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power and ability to subordinate members of racial minorities through the use of
inflammatory epithets, differential treatment, and other non-sexual activities.  In contrast, it
soon became clear that in the area of hostile work sexual harassment courts assumed that the
predicate act would involve conduct or speech of a sexual nature.  Even the name, “sex
discrimination,” promotes this understanding of the prototypical case, whereas an alternate
characterization of the cause of action as “gender discrimination” suggests a much broader
focus.  In the next part of the article I will discuss the development of the “reasonable
woman” standard for judging the severity or pervasiveness of a hostile work environment,
and then analyze how the rhetorical battles over this standard have helped to highlight the full
scope of gender discrimination to which Title VII should be addressed.
B. The “Reasonable Woman” Test   
Just months after the Vinson case interpreted Title VII to bar hostile work environment
sexual harassment, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important opinion in
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. that was widely cited in the following years.   The plaintiff16
alleged that a fellow employee was “an extremely vulgar and crude individual who
customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such
obscenities to the plaintiff,” that he was constantly confrontational with her, and that several
employees had posted pictures of nude or scantily-clad women in visible areas of their offices
and/or work areas.   The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff had17
failed to prove that she was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment, and
rejected the suggestion that it ought to judge the case from the plaintiff’s perspective.  The
court held that a plaintiff must first prove that the work environment would have interfered
with a “reasonable person” attempting to carry out employment duties and would have
seriously affected that person’s psychological well-being, and then also must prove that she
herself suffered these effects.  The court concluded:
Accordingly, a proper assessment or evaluation of an employment
environment that gives rise to a sexual harassment claim would invite
consideration of such objective and subjective factors as the nature of the
alleged harassment, the background and experience of the plaintiff, her
coworkers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical environment of the
plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment
of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's introduction into its
environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon
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voluntarily entering that environment. Thus, the presence of actionable sexual
harassment would be different depending upon the personality of the plaintiff
and the prevailing work environment and must be considered and evaluated
upon an ad hoc basis. As Judge Newblatt aptly stated in his opinion in the
district [trial] court:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work
environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to – or can – change this. It
must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for
the female workers of America.  But it is quite different to claim
that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.
Clearly, the Court's qualification is necessary to enable [the
regulations] to function as a workable judicial standard.
. . .
In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that
Henry’s obscenities, although annoying, were not so startling as
to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other
female employees.  The evidence did not demonstrate that this
single employee’s vulgarity substantially affected the totality of
the workplace.  The sexually oriented poster displays had a de
minimis effect on the plaintiff’s work environment when
considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly
features and commercially exploits open displays of written and
pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at
the cinema, and in other public places.  In sum, Henry’s vulgar
language, coupled with the sexually oriented posters, did not
result in a working environment that could be considered
intimidating, hostile, or offensive under [the EEOC guidelines]
as elaborated upon by this court.   The district court’s factual
findings supporting its conclusion to this effect were not clearly
erroneous.  It necessarily follows that the plaintiff failed to
sustain her burden of proof that she was the victim of a Title VII
 Id. at 620-22.18
 See, e.g., Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Authority, 997 F.2d 198, 203 (6  Cir. 1993); Rose v. Figgie19 th
Intern., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 41 (W.D. Mich., Feb 01, 1990); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center
Authority, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.N.J. May 26, 1990).
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sexual harassment violation.18
This analysis was positioned to set the rhetorical agenda for hostile work environment claims
in other courts, and a number of courts began to follow the lead of Rabidue.19
The rhetorical structure of the opinion is at once transparent and latent.  The court
emphasizes that the gateway to asserting a successful claim is to establish that a reasonable
person would find the workplace hostile.  This seemingly innocuous requirement must be
satisfied before the court assesses the effect of the workplace on the plaintiff.  On the surface
this appears to be a sensible approach to imposing liability on employers, but the proper
construction of the “reasonable person” is assumed and therefore unarticulated.  The court
lists a variety of factors, but provides no explanation of how one can determine the
reasonable person’s reaction to these factors.  The assumptions of reasonableness come to
the fore when the court adopts the trial judge’s memorandum by quoting it at length.  In sum,
the “reasonable person” understands that certain workplaces are rough environments with
sexual images and rude behavior, but that person is self-possessed enough not to be bothered
any more than a person is bothered by walking past sexually explicit photos outside an adult
cinema.  The “reasonable person” doesn’t expect the law to conform society to an ideal state,
and instead just regards the law as protecting persons from behavior that greatly exceeds the
bounds of social norms.  In sum, the “reasonable person” is a man.
It is important to note that the Rabidue case involved a fundamentally different
workplace problem than the Vinson case.  The plaintiff was not besieged by sexual overtures,
nor was she physically attacked and violated.  The question in Rabidue is not sexuality in the
workplace, but the general degradation and subordination of women that pervades the
workplace and makes clear to women that they are not taken seriously in that environment.
The “girlie magazines,” as the court so quaintly put the point, are a symptom of the
workplace norm that women are regarded as fantasy constructs relegated to the private sphere
rather addressed as colleagues.  The court simply didn’t understand the nature of the
complaint, inasmuch as it told the plaintiff that she should be used to living in a coarse and
sexist world, and should not expect more in a workplace.
Judge Keith wrote a powerful dissenting opinion that confronted the majority’s
rhetorical construction of “reasonableness.”  Keith argued that a conglomerate “reasonable
person” failed “to account for the wide divergence between most women’s views of
 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).20
 Id.21
 Id. at 627.22
 Id.23
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appropriate sexual conduct and those of men.”   Consequently, the court should adopt the20
perspective of a reasonable victim, so as to prevent the ossification of “ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.”   Prevailing workplace21
norms are the problem to be addressed rather than a defense to liability, leading Judge Keith
to argue vigorously against the majority’s suggestion that the background of the workforce
ought to be taken into account.
No court analyzes the background and experience of a supervisor who refuses
to promote black employees before finding actionable race discrimination
under Title VII.  An equally disturbing implication of considering defendant’s
backgrounds is the notion that workplaces with the least sophisticated
employees are the most prone to anti-female environments.  Assuming
arguendo this notion is true, by applying the prevailing workplace factor, this
court locks the vast majority of women into workplaces which tolerate anti-
female behavior.  I conclude that for actionable offensive environment claims,
the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct complained of is offensive to the
reasonable woman.  Either the environment affects her ability to perform or it
does not.  The backgrounds and experience of the defendant’s supervisors and
employees is irrelevant.22
Judge Keith regards Title VII as a mandate to ensure that all workplaces in the United States
are open to women, especially if the type of workplace has in the past been a bastion of male
prerogative.  Additionally, the presence of sexually degrading messages and images in
society provides no justification for permitting them to exist in a workplace that is required
to be free of discrimination.  He emphasizes that “the relevant inquiry at hand is what the
reasonable woman would find offensive, not society, which at one point also condoned
slavery.  I conclude that sexual posters and anti-female language can seriously affect the
psychological well being of the reasonable woman and interfere with her ability to perform
her job.”   Judge Keith used the notion of a “reasonable woman” to help clarify the barriers23
to full participation in the workplace caused by the expression of gendered power relations.
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly endorsed Judge Keith’s
analysis and adopted the “reasonable woman” test.  The facts of the case are particularly
 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9  Cir. 1991).24 th
 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND . L. REV.25
1183 (1989).  Abrams has refined her analysis in later articles.  See, e.g., The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); The Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, 1995
D ISSENT 48; Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 M ICH . L. REV. 2479 (1993); and Social Construction, Roving
Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021, 1033-39 (1992)
(detailing the risks and drawbacks to a reasonable woman standard).
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important, and so require an extended description.  In Ellison v. Brady, an employee of the
Federal Government (Ellison) alleged that she was sexually harassed by a non-supervisory
co-worker (Gray).  Ellison alleged that Gray hung around her desk, asked her to lunch when
nobody else was around, and generally made a nuisance of himself.  The day after declining
Gray’s invitation to lunch on a day that he had uncharacteristically dressed in a three-piece
suit, he handed Ellison a note saying that he had cried all night, was in constant turmoil, and
couldn’t bear to feel her hatred for another day.  Shocked and frightened, she left the room
and reported the matter to her supervisor.  She didn’t want official action to be taken, and
instead asked another man in the office to speak privately with Gray and make clear that she
wasn’t interested in a romantic relationship.  She left soon thereafter for a four week business
trip, during which time she received a three-page letter that she described as “a hundred times
weirder” than the first note; it frightened her and caused her to believe that he was
unbalanced.  Ellison demanded that Gray be transferred to another office, and he was gone
by the time she returned from her business trip.
Unfortunately, Gray then filed a union grievance and sought to return to Ellison’s
office.  The grievance was settled by agreeing that he could return after four more months
if he promised not to bother Ellison.  Upon hearing this news, Ellison became frantic and
sought her own transfer.  Gray then sought joint counseling to resolve any tensions and wrote
a third note to her that assumed they had some form of relationship.  In response to Ellison’s
claim, the EEOC determined that the employer had undertaken appropriate measures and
found no discrimination.  The trail court ruled that Gray’s conduct was isolated and trivial,
and that Ellison had failed to establish that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment by creating a hostile work environment.  On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed.
The court began by noting that Rabidue had not imposed liability on much more
egregious facts.   In contrast to testing the work environment from the perspective of a24
“reasonable person,” the court expressly embraced the “reasonable woman” standard by
drawing from the scholarship of Professor Kathryn Abrams and others.   In response to the25
findings that Gray’s actions were not “severe or pervasive” enough to create a hostile
environment, the court elaborated the perspective from which such judgments must be made.
 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79.26
 In footnote 11 which appears at this point, the court indicated: “Of course, where male employees allege that27
co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the appropriate victim’s perspective would be that
of a reasonable man.”
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Next, we believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual
harassment, we should focus on the perspective of the victim. . . . If we only
examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing
conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of
discrimination.  Harassers could continue to harass merely because a particular
discriminatory practice was common, and victims of harassment would have
no remedy.
We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the victim’s
perspective.  A complete understanding of the victim’s view requires, among
other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women.
Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women.
. . .
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as
a group, but we believe that many women share common concerns which men
do not necessarily share.  For example, because women are disproportionately
victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be
concerned with sexual behavior.  Women who are victims of mild forms of
sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct is
merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.  Men, who are rarely victims of
sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full
appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a
woman my perceive.26
From this basis of understanding, the court emphasized that the standard of whether
the hostility was sufficiently severe or pervasive was not one of strict liability, but rather an
objective test of reasonableness that is culture-bound and therefore dynamic.
In order to shield employers from having to accommodate the
idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee, we hold that a
female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman  would27
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
 In footnote 12 which appears at this point, the court indicated: “We realize that the reasonable woman28
standard will not address conduct which some women find offensive.  Conduct considered harmless by many today may
be considered discriminatory in the future. . . . Fortunately, the reasonableness inquiry which we adopt today is not static.
As the views of reasonable women change, so too does the Title VII standard of acceptable behavior.”
 Ellison, 924 F. 2d at 879.29
 Id. at 879-80.30
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and create an abusive working environment.  . . . 28 29
The court emphasized that the “reasonable woman” standard afforded no special privileges
to women employees, but instead ensured that employees were treated equally by respecting
their differences.
  
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we
believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women.  The reasonable
woman standard does not establish a higher level of protection for women than
men. . . . Instead, a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment
enables women to participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men.
By acknowledging and not trivializing the effects of sexual harassment on
reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither men nor
women will have to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege
of being allowed to work and make a living.” Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11  Cir. 1982).th
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies
conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that
their conduct creates a hostile working environment.  Well-intentioned
compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a sexual
harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the
plaintiff would consider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
a condition of employment and create an abusive working environment.  That
is because Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme. . . . to avoid liability under
Title VII, employers may have to educate and sensitize their workforce to
eliminate conduct which a reasonable victim would consider unlawful sexual
harassment.30
With this legal backdrop established, the court then described why Gray’s conduct
amounted to sexual harassment when considered from the perspective of a reasonable
woman.
 Id. at 880.31
 Id. at 880-81.32
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The facts of this case illustrate the importance of considering the
victim’s perspective.  Analyzing the facts from the alleged harasser’s
viewpoint, Gray could be portrayed as a modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac
wishing no more than to woo Ellison with his words.  There is no evidence that
Gray harbored ill will toward Ellison.  He even offered in his “love letter” to
leave her alone if she wished.  Examined in this light, it is not difficult to see
why the district court characterized Gray’s conduct as isolated and trivial.
Ellison, however, did not consider the acts to be trivial.  Gray’s first
note shocked and frightened her.  After receiving the three-page letter, she
became really upset and frightened again.  She immediately requested that she
or Gray be transferred.  Her supervisor’s prompt response suggests that she too
did not consider the conduct trivial.  When Ellison learned that Gray arranged
to return to San Mateo, she immediately asked to transfer, and she immediately
filed an official complaint.
We cannot say as a matter of law that Ellison’s reaction was
idiosyncratic or hyper-sensitive.  We believe that a reasonable woman could
have had a similar reaction. . . .31
The court concluded by recalling Judge Keith’s dissent in Rabidue and then characterizing
Title VII as a remedial measure designed to change the American workplace and thereby
ensure equal opportunity for women.
 
Sexual harassment is a major problem in the workplace.  Adopting the
victim’s perspective ensures that courts will not “sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders.” Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898,
quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).  Congress did not
enact title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices.  To the contrary,
“Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a
sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment
opportunities for women.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.  We hope that over time
both men and women will learn what conduct we establish today, the current
gap in perception between the sexes will be bridged.32
This inspiring language in Ellison v. Brady was followed by a number of courts and remains
 The “reasonable woman” standard has been applied in fact by other Courts of Appeals, even if they have not33
provided a full theoretical assessment and articulation of the test.  See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 525
F.3d 1130, 1147 (11  Cir. 2008) (concluding that it was “objectively reasonable that a woman in Reeve’s position wouldth
have felt humiliated in such circumstances”); Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 117 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that “a jury could easily find that a reasonable woman in Thomas’s position would be intimidated, in a way not
experienced by a man ...”).  Notable state court decisions that follow Ellison include Radtke v. Everett, D.V.M., 471
N.W.2d 660 (Mich. App. 1991) (rejecting Rabidue and endorsing a “reasonable woman” standard as articulated in
Ellison in interpreting state anti-discrimination law) and Lehman v. Toys ‘R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993)
(construing New Jersey state anti-discrimination law to adopt a “reasonable woman” standard as articulated in Ellison).
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the law in the Ninth Circuit.   However, the courts have only begun to clarify the reality of33
gender discrimination that is evoked by the soaring rhetoric.
We can see immediately that Ellison involved a case of sexual desire that led to a very
frightening situation for Ellison.  The court’s analysis of how a “reasonable woman” would
perceive the situation emphasizes the very different social construction of sexual
relationships by men and women, with many women fearing violent or unwanted sexual
contact in ways that many men might not understand.  But this sensitive acknowledgment of
gender differences, due to the facts of the case, is cast in sexual terms.  As women entered
the workplace in substantial numbers following World War II they faced a situation in which
the private world of sexuality became part of the workplace, subjecting them to unwanted
additional demands and affronts that did not impede their male colleagues.  But this framing
of the problem of a “hostile work environment” for women misses the element of power and
subordination that defined the cases of racial harassment, leading to the limitation of sexual
harassment as an outgrowth of sexual relations between men and women.  While the court
carefully notes that the realistic fear of sexual assault may shape women’s perspectives on
behavior of a sexual nature, the court has no reason on the facts before it to explore the fact
that sexual assault is a crime of violence and subordination rather than an act of desire.  The
use of sexual acts by a supervisor, including sexual assault, to demean and subordinate a
woman employee was the basis of the Supreme Court’s Meritor Savings Bank case, but the
gendered nature of power in the workplace remained unanalyzed.  In contrast, the Ellison
court endorsed a gendered perspective on sexual harassment, but did so in the context of a
pathetic and bizarre romantic overtures by a co-worker, and so did not have to explore the
deeper levels of subordination in a sophisticated manner.
Another legacy of the Ellison decision is that it highlighted a fundamental issue in
feminist jurisprudence in the United States: the debate between “difference,” “sameness,”
and “postmodern” theorists about the nature of the battle for equality in the American
workplace.  “Difference feminists” argue that women have different (socially-constructed)
experiences that require sensitivity in addressing questions of equality, and they generally
support efforts to acknowledge these differences to ensure equality in fact, rather than simply
abstract equality.  “Sameness feminists” argue that women have been impeded in history
 523 U.S. 75 (1998).34
 Id. at 80-81.35
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precisely by the social determination that they are different, and that equality can be achieved
when women are not regarded paternalistically as requiring the special protection of the state.
“Postmodern feminists” question the bivalent thinking that animates the debate between
difference and sameness feminists, and argue that the socially-constructed nature of gender
and the ideological construction of any “reasonable” norm – whether gendered or not –
compels a less universalistic approach.  It is impossible to survey this literature in such a
short article, but it bears emphasis that the judicial adoption of the “reasonable woman”
standard implicates the debates among these important and complex analyses.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the “reasonable
woman” standard, but Justice Scalia’s opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.  generally is regarded as providing support for this approach.  In Oncale the Court dealt34
with allegations of same-sex harassment by a male employee on an offshore oil rig who was
accused by fellow workers of being gay and was also subjected to physical and emotional
harassment of a sexual nature.  The Court acknowledged that sexual desire is not the
gravamen of a Title VII action because the workers in Oncale were not (consciously) seeking
sexual contact with the plaintiff employee as an expression of their sexual attraction to men.
The Court’s discussion, though, failed to clarify the nature of the civil rights action other than
to leave it to a matter of reasoned judgment.  Justice Scalia writes: 
But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably
find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such
sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that
the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
“discrimina[tion] . . . because of ... sex.”35
. . . .
We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position, considering “all the circumstances.” Harris, supra, at 23, 114 S.Ct.,
at 371.  In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
 Id. at 81-82.36
 Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L.37
REV. 1257, 1261 (1998). 
 After its articulation, the “reasonable woman” standard has been adapted to other forms of discrimination.38
As explained in the leading treatise in the context of racial harassment:
 The parallel question for racial harassment is whether to use a “reasonable black person”
standard.  A district court in Maine adopted this standard to assess the severity of racial harassment
under Title VII and the Main Human Rights Act (MHRA) in Harris v. International Paper Co. [765
F. Supp. 1509 (D.Me. 1991), vacated in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D.Me. 1991).  See
also Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9  Cir. 2002) (“reasonable Korean” standard usedth
without discussion).]
The incident in question in Harris concerned the placement of a post card next to the time
clock within a week of the African-American plaintiff’s arrival at the paper mill.  The post card
depicted “Our Gang” and the handwritten caption said: “The new generation of papermakers.”  It
depicted the “Little Rascals” attempting to wash a dog and the black character “Buckwheat” was set
apart from the other children, who were white.  The term “Buckwheat” was also used routinely in the
mill as a racial epithet.  The court found that these circumstances could reasonably be perceived by
an African-American to be abusive.  “Since the concern of Title VII and the MHRA is to redress the
effects of conduct and speech on their victims,” the court said, “the fact finder must ‘walk a mile in
the victim’s shoes’ to understand those effects and how they should be remedied.”  The court then
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consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is
experienced by its target.  A professional football player’s working
environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach
smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same
behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary
(male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.  Common sense,
and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the
same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position
would find severely hostile or abusive.36
Commenting shortly after the case was decided, pioneering theorist Kathryn Abrams noted
that nearly “a dozen federal and state courts have used or cited the work of feminist
commentators on the “reasonable woman” standard” and that Oncale suggests “a willingness
to take account of feminist thinking on the “reasonableness”standard” that may provide a
“trajectory with which we can work.”   It might be more accurate to suggest that Oncale37
reveals the degree to which the courts have failed to explore fully the implications of feminist
theory for sexual harassment law as much as it gives rise to optimism about the possibility
of this exploration in the future.38
explicitly adopted the “reasonable black person” standard by which to measure the hostility of the
environment.  Other courts have continued to use the “reasonable person” test in racial harassment as
in sexual harassment cases.
MARK ROTHSTEIN , CHARLES CRAVER, ELINOR SCHROEDER AND ELAINE SHOBEN , EM PLOYM ENT LAW  (St. Paul, MN: West
Group, 4  ed. 2009), §2.12.  The test has also been extended to harassment on the grounds of religious affiliation.  Id.th
at §2.13.      
 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).  It is worth noting that Judge Stephens was a trial judge39
sitting by designation with the Court of Appeals, and that his perspective on the nature of the trials that would follow
from the adoption of the “reasonable woman” standard may be rooted in a different sense of practicalities than his fellow
panelists.
 See Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, in SEXUAL40
HARASSM ENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 207-13 (Linda LeMoncheck and James P. Sterba, Eds.) Oxford: Oxford University
Press (2001), pp. 209-11.  A recent article surveys the key literature: 
Several landmark articles have discussed the utility of a reasonable woman standard, while not
advocating its adoption.  See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND . L. REV. 1183 (1989) (arguing that sexual harassment claims should be
cognizable as long as the harasser engaged in sexually oriented behavior and the victim experienced
feelings of coercion or devaluation); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (rejecting
the reasonable woman standard as not able to address the diversity of women’s experiences); Nancy
S. Ehrenereich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard, as well as the
reasonable person standard, as relying on false ideas about objectivity and social consensus with the
effect of supporting the status quo of subordination).
Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 M ICH . L. REV. 1797, 1799 n. 8.  Wildman
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C. The Rhetorical Contours of the “Reasonable Woman”
The substitution of a “reasonable woman” standard for the “reasonable person”
standard of sexual harassment law is an important rhetorical strategy that raises as many
questions as it answers.  In the Ninth Circuit Ellis case, the dissenting judge argued that
liability conditioned on the gender of the victim undermined the principle of equality that
girds Title VII.  Judge Stephens regarded it to be a “puzzlement” if two employees sued on
account of the same conditions in a particular workplace, but one employee prevails because
she is a woman and the other employee loses because he is a man.   His criticism of the39
standard is based on the commonsensical claim that identifying workplaces “polluted” by
sexual harassment should be the goal of civil rights laws, rather than compensating parties
differently depending on their gender.
The argument that it is unfairly discriminatory to distinguish between “reasonable
men” and “reasonable women” in the workplace has given rise to a lively debate in the
literature.  Some feminist legal theorists acknowledge the appeal of the “reasonable woman”
standard but are cautious about essentializing the experience of women into an objective and
unified construction.   Others contend that a failure to recognize the differences between the40
also notes that some feminists argue that the reasonable woman standard is harmful to the feminist cause, citing “Anita
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 454 (1997) (urging that “reasonable
cannot anchor sexual harassment law”) [and] Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN .
L. REV. 691, 750 (1997) (contending the reasonable woman standard resolves sex-based bias at the price of enforcing
gender stereotypes).”  Id. at 1780, n.9.
 For articles advocating the use of the reasonable woman standard in sexual41
harassment cases, see Deborah S. Brenneman, From a Women’s Point of View: The
Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN .
L. REV. 1281, 1305-06 (1992) (urging that a reasonable woman standard is
necessary in order to adequately address the problem of sexual harassment since
men and women have divergent views on acceptable workplace behavior); Lynn
Dennison, An Argument for the Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile
Environment Claims, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 495-96 (1993) (arguing that the
reasonable woman standard should be used to evaluate sexual harassment claims
because it recognizes and gives validity to more diversity of perspective than the
reasonable person standard does); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the
Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 776 (contending that the reasonable
woman standard should be used to evaluate the defendant’s conduct in civil cases,
including sexual harassment, in which “the perceptions of men and women differ
as the existence and seriousness of the harmful conduct”); Elizabeth A. Glidden,
The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in Combating Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment, 77 IOW A L. REV. 1825, 1829 (1992) (advocating the adoption
of a reasonable woman standard in order to combat sexual harassment, particular
as [a] means of promoting “greater employer consciousness in discovering and
rectifying sexual harassment problems”); David I. Pinkston, Redefining Objectivity:
The Case for the Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims,
1993 B.Y.U.L.REV. 363, 364 (advocating the reasonable woman standard because
it “more fully achieves the purposes of Title VII by better protecting female
employees, reducing sexual harassment, and in ensuring an objective, fair standard
upon which employers and employees can rely”).
Id. at 1799-80, n.9.
 This principle was established in two important cases decided by the Supreme Court in tandem.  Burlington42
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  It is important
to keep in mind that Title VII imposes liability on the employer as an entity, not on the co-employee who creates the
hostile environment, and so there must be some manner of limiting this vicarious liability.  The co-employee may be sued
in tort for assault, battery, interference with prospective business advantage, and may even be subjected to criminal
prosecution.
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workplace experiences of men and women will fail to overcome the status quo construction
of the workplace according to male norms.   Still others argue that the “reasonable woman”41
standard must extend in scope if it is to accomplish the desired goal of permitting women to
be truly equal before the law.  For example, employers may assert an affirmative defense to
a hostile work environment claim if they had established adequate procedures for reporting
such conditions and dealing with them appropriately, but the plaintiff failed to take advantage
of such opportunities before filing the claim.   In a recent article, a scholar argues that courts42
should understand that “reasonable women” don’t utilize complaint procedures for a variety
of socially-constructed reasons that should not disable their claims, and so the “reasonable
 L. Camille Herbert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND . L.J.43
711 (2007).  Herbert offers a nuanced discussion of this topic, drawing from empirical research.
 Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in Personal Injury Law, 45 ST.44
LOUIS U.L.J. 769 (2001).
 It is important to underscore that adopting such a view constitutes an insoluble problem for achieving the goal45
of a discrimination free workplace only if adjusting employer behavior to make the workplace accommodating for
reasonable women would simultaneously render the workplace hostile to reasonable men.  It is difficult to imagine such
a scenario, and so requiring the employer to be responsive to the perspective of the reasonable woman does not create
a double bind.  
 Abrams, New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, supra note 24, at 1171.  Specifically, Abrams argues that46
Anita Bernstein’s reconceptualization of sexual harassment from the perspective of how “respectful persons” would
behave fails to address gendered workplace norms.  “Declining to identify the gendered character of sexual harassment
both effects a moral and political neutering of the problem and imposes and unnecessary impediment to remedying or
preventing it.”  Id. at 1188 (criticizing Bernstein, supra note 40).  See also, Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman,
supra note 40, at 211-13 (articulating an approach that does not depend on constructing the “reasonable woman” to mean
the average female in society, but rather to refer to “the person enlightened concerning the barriers to women’s inequality
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woman” standard should apply not only to determining liability but also to judging this
affirmative defense.   Another scholar argues that the standard of a “reasonable woman” can43
be extended to the ubiquitous concept of the “reasonable person” in tort law as part of a
broader feminist critique of law.44
This debate is best addressed by returning to the central question of the nature of the
harm of sexual harassment in the American workplace.  Title VII is a civil rights statute, not
a liability statute.  Its purpose is to ensure that all persons may participate fully in the labor
economy without regard to their gender; it is not a fault-based scheme of liability that focuses
on the wrongdoing of the perpetrator.  Under these circumstances it is perfectly appropriate
for courts to view the challenged conduct from the perspective of the complaining party as
the means to ensure that the employer is not maintaining a discriminatory workplace.   The45
qualifier “reasonable” is necessary because the legal standard is not premised on a particular
person’s reaction to the workplace, but rather on the effects that the workplace has on
individuals because of their gender.  When “reasonable” is construed as “the average
woman” or “the typical woman” it raises the dilemmas of essentialism.  But this is not the
only conception of reasonableness that can guide decisionmaking.
Kathryn Abrams is one of the prominent scholars who helped to develop the concept
of the “reasonable woman” standard and her work provided one of the bases for the Ellison
opinion.  Although recognizing that the standard poses difficulties, Abrams has urged that
these difficulties are minimized if the nature of the wrong of sexual harassment is
conceptualized “as the institutionalization of women’s subordination” in the American
workplace.   Abrams insists that subordination is not accomplished in only one manner, and46
in the workplace.”) 
 Abrams, New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, supra note 24, at 1214-15, 1217.47
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therefore a theoretical construction of subordination in the workplace must be contextual,
pragmatic and plural.  Her account
connects harassment with a set of explicit sex and gender based dynamics.  It
intensifies, rather than abstracts from, the focus on context that has
characterized leading accounts of sexual harassment. . . . [I]t analyzes sexual
harassment as arising not only from broad social patterns but also from
particular patterns specific to the workplace. . . . Sexual harassment, as
depicted here, is a . . . plural phenomenon . . . . There is harassment that
secures the workplace as a site of male control versus harassment that secures
it as a zone of either male comfort or masculine normative entrenchment.
. . . .
A persistent assumption that one dynamic should explain everything about
women’s oppression has made it difficult for feminists to demand pregnancy
leaves under equality based theories, fight job segregation under difference
based theories, and highlight women’s agency under dominance based
theories.  Instead, feminists should argue that one size cannot fit all,
theoretically speaking: it is critical to see women’s inequality as the product
of many intersecting motives, constructions, and modes of treatment.  Because
sexual harassment has captured public attention to perhaps a greater degree
than any other gender based injury, an understanding of sexual harassment that
is explicitly, paradigmatically plural will be a tremendous resource in this
effort.47
Abrams promotes a contextualized approach that is guided by a theoretical understanding of
subordination, but which inevitably requires judgment in light of multiple factors.
To effectuate this subtle approach in the doctrinal law of sexual harassment it is
necessary to make a critical shift in the analysis.  The Ellis court adopted the “reasonable
woman” standard for the very limited purpose of determining when behavior is “severe or
pervasive” enough to constitute a violation of Title VII, thereby limiting the analysis from
the broader scope suggested by Judge Keith in his Rabidue dissent.  The central underlying
assumption is that men and women differ only in the extent to which they can suffer sexual
harassment, and not in their very perception of what constitutes harassment.  Equating sexual
harassment with some kind of variation on sexual relations makes this assumption possible,
and this equation is precisely the target at which the “reasonable woman” standard should
 As one critic of the circumscribed “reasonable woman” standard argues, an “analysis beyond the reasonable48
woman that recognizes systems of privilege, particularly male privilege, is necessary to truly give woman a law of her
own.”  Wildman, Ending Privilege, supra note 40, at 1821.  This insight is particularly important because women can
internalize the system of male privilege as a way to survive male-dominated workplaces, leaving courts to puzzle over
the testimony of some women employees that the posting of violent pornographic images in a shipyard workplace was
not upsetting.  Id. at 1803-04 (discussing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
 See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 239 (2004) (arguing that socially constructed49
gender norms that privilege white male heterosexuals are problematic for many men as well as women, and that Title
VII should be more broadly construed to address this social dynamic at the root of harassment); Katherine M. Franke,
What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN . L. REV. 691 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment law fails to
understand that sexism constructs the identities of both men and women and is developed through stereotypes of both
genders).
 Lehman, 626 A.2d at 453.50
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be aimed.  Construing sexual harassment as the subordination of women in the workplace
on account of their gender would lead to a broader, and more profitable, use of the reasonable
woman standard.
Following this shift in theory of sexual harassment, we might recast the “reasonable
woman” standard by requiring courts to determine if “the woman plaintiff had reason to feel
subordinated in the workplace on account of her gender,” and, if so, to regard this as a
violation of Title VII.   By substituting “subordination” for the current standard – whether48
a reasonable woman would find the workplace to be hostile, intimidating, or threatening on
account of her sex – we can reframe the cases in a more productive fashion.  One benefit of
this approach is that it accommodates masculinities studies, which demonstrate that the social
construction of gender roles is not solely a question of constraining women but also
constraining men.   Moving away from the paradigm case of sexually aggressive men49
upsetting demure women requires a rethinking of the “reasonable woman” standard in these
broader terms.
In adopting the “reasonable woman” test under state law, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey provided a sophisticated discussion that raised these issues.  First, the court
emphasized that the wrongful conduct need not be sexual in nature, but instead occurs
because of the sex of the victim and results in a hostile work environment.   The court then50
explained the necessity of a gendered standard is in part required because of the gendered
character of power relations in the workplace.
[In] many areas of the workforce, women still represent a minority and are
relatively recent entrants into the field.  Because of their predominantly junior and
minority status, for some women it is more difficult than it is for men to win
credibility and respect from employers, coworkers, and clients or customer.  That can
 Id. at 459.51
 Davis v. Team Electric Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1096 (9  Cir. 2008).52 th
 Id. at 1085.53
 Id. at 1087.54
 Id. at 1096.  See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F. 3d 428 (7  Cir. 1995), in which Judge Posner55 th
writes for the court to reverse a jury finding of sexual harassment based on seven months of statements by the supervisor
that the plaintiff is a “pretty girl,” that “pretty girls run around naked,” etc.  Judge Posner concluded that it “is no doubt
distasteful to a sensitive woman to have such a silly man as one’s boss, but only a woman of Victorian delicacy – a
woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity – would find
Hall’s patter substantially more distressing than the heat and cigarette smoke of which the plaintiff does not complain.
Id. at 431.  Judge Posner inexplicably fails to understand that Congress has not attempted to regulate the misogynist
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make women’s position in the workplace marginal or precarious from the start.
Sexual harassment operates to further discredit the female employee by treating her
as a sexual object rather than as a credible co-worker.  That can both undermine the
woman’s self-confidence and interfere with her ability to be perceived by others as
a capable worker with the potential to advance and succeed.  Abrams, supra, 42
Vand. L. Rev. at 1208-09.  Because of women’s different status in the workplace,
conduct that may be “just a joke” for men may have far more serious implications for
women.51
The factual circumstances in several cases underscore how this new construction of sexual
harassment by more broadly employing the reasonable woman standard might dramatically
recast the judicial rhetoric of Title VII.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed
the entry of summary judgment, finding that the allegations were sufficient to require the
fact-finder to judge the severity and pervasiveness of the alleged hostile work environment
discrimination.   The court noted that it was a close question, because the allegations fell far52
short of physical abuse or aggressive sexual advances that form the prototypical case.
Apparently having no sense of irony, the court reported that the plaintiff was hired as a
“journeyman electrician” but then faced what she alleged to be a hostile work environment.53
She complained that she was given less desirable overhead work assignments on a repetitive
basis that caused her to suffer neck pain, she was excluded from job site meetings, she was
given inferior equipment, she faced sexual comments and a co-worker drained her  car
battery by turning on her lights.   The court concludes that a reasonable woman might find54
the incidents so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment, but it
appears to miss the problem posed by the (non-sexualized) gendered workplace.  The
complaint is best understood as claiming that a woman was ostracized and excluded because
she was not welcome in this “male” trade, but instead the court claimed that it was a case that
fell somewhere between mild “sexual horseplay” that a reasonable woman ought to tolerate
and unwelcome sexual advances and taunts.55
elements of contemporary culture, but has chosen to regulate these elements in the American workplace.   
 Lavarias v. Hui O’Kakoa, LLC, 2007 WL 3331866 (D. Hawai’i) (Nov. 7, 2007).56
 Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1031-33 (9  Cir. 2005).57 th
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Similarly, a court granted summary judgment when the allegations were premised on
the events of a single day, concluding that a reasonable woman would not regard the
workplace as polluted.   The plaintiff was a black belt working as a security guard at a Naval56
Base who was diagnosed with work-related anxiety after an incident and its aftermath.  On
a hot day she went to the women’s restroom, partially disrobed, and was washing off in the
sink when she noticed a uniformed male guard in a stall watching her.  She ran from the
room, reported the incident, and was met by laughter; then, she began crying, asked if she
would lose her job, and sought emergency medical care.  The court states the obvious: this
was not an extreme event, such a rape or sexual assault, that could immediately render the
workplace hostile.  However, the court’s supposition that a reasonable woman would not find
these circumstances severe enough to create a sexually hostile environment reveals the
limitations of its rhetorical construction.  First, the court determines the reasonableness of
the plaintiff’s response only after noting that she is accomplished in self-defense and works
as a security guard in a military environment, suggesting that the court might be infusing its
reasonable woman standard with the conclusion that she was as equipped as a man to deal
with such an upset.  This points to the deeper issue that goes unquestioned: what was the
nature of the plaintiff’s work environment that led to this obviously offensive and upsetting
event to destroy her ability to return to work?  It is plausible that she had struggled to be one
of the men in this highly gendered profession, until the perpetrator literally uncovered her
gender and she was reduced to tears before unsympathetic co-workers.  It was not a single
sexualized incident that should have been analyzed by the court, but rather the potential that
the workplace was a prototypically macho environment in which a woman must act like a
strong man to succeed, a requirement that might have immediately been made clear by the
string of emotional assaults suffered by the plaintiff.
To be sure, there are courts that have expanded the “reasonable woman standard” to
assess the discriminatory character of the workplace rather than using it just as a measure of
the severity or pervasiveness of sexual activity in the workplace, although they remain under-
theorized.  The Ninth Circuit reversed entry of summary judgment, holding that a reasonable
woman would find the workplace objectively hostile as a result of sexists comments by her
supervisor, such as “women have no business in construction,” “women should only be in
subservient positions,” “Every woman that comes to our division gets pregnant . . . I hope
you don’t get pregnant,” and “I would never work for a woman.”   These statements57
evidenced animus against women in the workplace, creating a hostile work environment on
the basis of sex despite the lack of sexual desire or aggressiveness displayed by the
 The supervisor did tell sexually explicit jokes in the workplace, id. at 1031, but the court mentions this as part58
of a long list of sexist comments and appears to understand that sexually demeaning jokes often are used to assert power
on the basis of gender rather than to sexualize the workplace.  As the court concludes, “there is nothing vague about [the
supervisor’s] comments; rather, they overtly exhibit his hostility to women in the workplace.”  Id. at 1038.
 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493 (M.D. Fla. 1991).59
 Id. at 1502-09.60
 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1755-74 (1998).  61
 Schultz describes the problem succinctly: “By focusing on sexual advances as the quintessential harassment,62
the paradigm encourages courts to extend protection to women for the wrong reasons.  Rather than emphasizing the use
of harassment law to promote women’s empowerment and equality as workers, it subtly appeals to judges to protect
women’s sexual virtue or sensibilities.” Id. at 1729.  Her reconceptualization of sexual harassment follows:
Courts have not understood, however, that the gender stratification of work – who does what
kind of work, under what conditions, and for what reward – is at least as influential as sexual relations
in producing women’s disadvantage.  Although judges understand that women are victimized as sexual
objects, they have not been able to see that women are also systematically harassed, discriminated
against, and marginalized as workers in ways that render them unequal on the job and, as a result, in
many other realms of life. . . . To most judges, sexual advances seem intuitively gender-based because
cultural-radical feminists, and the sexual desire-dominance paradigm they inspired, have articulated
how women are harmed through sexual relations.  Yet, in part because no political tradition has
expressed with the same force the ways in which women are rendered unequal through workplace
relations, judges have difficulty perceiving the characteristic problems that confront working women
as gender-based.
In case after case in which nonsexual harassment predominates, in both hostile work
environment claims and the disparate treatment claims from which they are disaggregated, the courts
have rendered decisions on causation that reveal a fundamental lack of understanding of the gender-
based quality of harassing and harmful actions directed at women in the workplace.  In the most
egregious group of cases, courts seem to be engaged in outright denial.  They refuse to characterize
conduct as sex-based even when it is accompanied by expressions of resentment or unease directed
at women workers who try to make it in traditionally male occupations or jobs.
. . . .
In other cases, courts have found that women workers’ mistreatment was prompted by their own
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supervisor.   Similarly, a federal district court judge held that a female welder suffered58
hostile work environment discrimination when she entered what amounted to “a boys club”
where “women form less than 5 percent of the skilled crafts,”  after considering expert59
testimony of the gender stereotyping that motivated the sexualized behavior and images in
the workplace.      60
Cases like this lean close to adopting what Professor Vicki Schultz terms a
“competence centered paradigm” rather than the “sexual paternalism” that assumes that
tender women are more easily scandalized by sexuality than their male counterparts.61
Schultz was a pioneering voice in the effort to decouple “hostile work environment” cases
from the sexual desire paradigm and to acknowledge the gendered power relations at work
in many of the cases, even if the power was expressed through sexualized images.62
shortcomings rather than by their own sex – even as judges disregard signs that the evaluation of the plaintiffs’
competence may not have been free from gender stereotyping. . . .
Indeed, in numerous cases in which women work in male-dominated settings, courts have
overlooked evidence that the denigration of women’s competence, authority, or entitlement to the job
is itself a core component of what makes the work environment sexist and hostile. . . .
Id. at 1749-50.  She then concludes:
The sexual desire-dominance paradigm is too narrow.  Although its triumph has been viewed
as a feminist victory, that success has rung hollow for the many women (and men) who experience
forms of harassment that it does not envision.  Most centrally, the paradigm has failed large numbers
of people who are not subjected to sexual abuse, but whose competence as workers is constantly thrust
into conflict with their identities as women or gender-nonconforming men.  We need an account of
hostile work environment harassment that recognizes that sexuality is only on e tool that male workers
can deploy in a struggle to maintain the masculine composition and image of more highly rewarded
jobs.  Conversely, the account should acknowledge that sexuality is not inherently gender-biased; in
some contexts, it can be a neutral or even positive resource for women (and nonconforming men).
Id. at 1796-97.  See also Vicki Schultz, Sex Is the Least of It: Let’s Focus Harassment Law on Work, Not Sex, in SEXUAL
HARASSM ENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 269-73 (Linda LeMoncheck and James P. Sterba, Eds.) Oxford, Oxford University
Press (2001), p. 273 (“Once we realize that the problem isn’t sex but sexism, we can re-establish our concept of
harassment on firmer ground.  Title VII was never meant to police sexuality.  It was meant to provide people the chance
to pursue their life’s work on equal terms–free of pressure to conform to notions of how women and men are supposed
to behave in their work roles.”).  
 Wildman, Ending Privilege, supra note 40, at 1798.63
 Id. at 1804.64
 Id. at 1821.65
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Stephanie Wildman has advocated moving “beyond the reasonable woman” in just this
manner.  She argues: “By failing to address the systems of privilege that maintain the sex-
based, gendered status quo, the reasonable woman standard cannot go far enough to ensure
that the legal system will recognize women’s harms.”    Wildman notes the difficulties in63
cases involving sexual behavior when some women in the workplace testify that they were
not offended, concluding that it is “unclear, where women themselves disagree, why the
reasonable woman standard would always (or even often) lead to the vindication of women
who complain about sexual harassment.”   If the “reasonable woman” standard is to have64
any efficacy, it must be expanded from its current application to recognize “systems of
privilege, particularly male privilege” in order to effectuate the purpose of Title VII.  65
The limitations of the narrow use of the reasonable woman standard to determine if
the sexualization of the workplace was severe or pervasive enough to amount to a civil rights
violation is to disregard situations in which the sexual overtures may not be problematic in
themselves, but courts may be ignoring the underlying hostile work environment based on
gender.  There are many cases in which a supervisory employee makes sexual advances in
a clumsy manner that the courts conclude is not a civil rights violation, but which the courts
might see in a different light if the implications of these otherwise uncomfortable exchanges
 See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7  Cir. 1993) (no actionable harassment66 th
when supervisor asked plaintiff for dates, put his hand on her shoulder several times, place “I love you” signs in her work
area, and attempted to kiss her in a bar); Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10 F. 3d 526, 528, 534-35 (7th
Cir. 1993) (no actionable sexual harassment where supervisor placed his hand on the plaintiff’s leg above the knee
several times, rubbed his hand along her inner thigh, and pulled her into the doorway and kissed her for several seconds).
 Kathryn Abrams acknowledges that, despite the seemingly obvious need to take into account women’s67
experiences in judging sexual harassment, the articulation of the “reasonable woman” standard encountered difficulties.
All of these factors suggested the preferability of a “reasonable woman” standard.  This
formulation would explicitly challenge notions of a universal perspective.  It would characterize the
evaluation of harassment, like the experience of harassment itself, as a phenomenon strongly
differentiated on the basis of gender.  The gender-specific language would place male judges on alert
that they could not longer rely on their unexamined intuitions.  The “reasonable woman” standard
would replace those intuitions with a perspective that promised a radical revision of workplace
conditions.  Yet beyond the notion that such a perspective would “take harassment seriously” –
viewing it neither as a right of the employer, not as a harmless, if vulgar, form of male amusement –
there was little explicit discussion of what insights or sensibilities it entailed.
Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman, supra note 40, at 209.   
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are understood in light of the details of workplace dynamics.   And yet, the proposal to fully66
embrace the reasonable woman standard to determine what constitutes a hostile work
environment leads to the persistent criticism that even the narrow use of the reasonable
woman standard courts substantial practical difficulties.  The question, then, is whether the
rhetorical resources of anti-discrimination law are sufficiently rich to support the full
realization of the standard.   
D. Practical Issues in Implementing the Reasonable Woman Standard
From the beginning, the use of the “reasonable woman” standard has sparked
controversy and dissent in the courts because of the perceived difficulties of articulating and
fairly applying this standard.   I acknowledge these concerns, but argue that the difficulties67
arise because the courts have attempted to use the reasonable woman standard to measure
whether the sexually offensive behavior in question was offensive enough to interfere with
the working conditions of a reasonable woman.  This approach puts courts on a fool’s errand,
because women have a variety of responses to sexuality, whether in the workplace or outside
the workplace.  Without any theoretical backing to explain how courts may determine the
sensibilities of a reasonable woman, the standard will be helpful in some cases involving
obvious gendered differences in perceptions. However, it is unlikely that the standard will
lead to genuine reform of hostile workplace sexual harassment law when limited to current
application.
In the Ellison case, a strong dissent was written by Judge Stevens, a trial court judge
sitting with the Court of Appeals by designation.  It is unsurprising that a judge tasked with
hearing cases at the trial level would be concerned about how to render this new “reasonable
 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).68
 See Jeremy D. Pasternak, Comment: Sexual Harassment and Expertise: The Admissibility of Expert Witness69
Testimony in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman Standard, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651 (1995).  Pasternak argues
that it is “not only permissible, but necessary” for judges to admit expert testimony regarding the gendered character of
employee reactions to hostile work environment situations, concluding that failure to do so is “antithetical to the very
notions embodied in the establishment of the reasonable woman standard.” Id. at 654.  He discusses a variety of cases
in which judges considered whether the admit expert testimony, and summarizes: “Expert witness testimony that might
address the reasonable woman standard is cultural testimony.  That is, it seeks to define a cultural norm, here the views
of American women’s culture on the subject of sexual harassment.” Id. at 676.
Barbara Gutek explains the pervasiveness in sexual harassment in the workplace as a result of “sex-role
spillover” and its effect on women employees in a manner that provides the framework for offering such expert testimony
in support of the reasonable woman standard.  Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, in SEXUAL
HARASSM ENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 50-61 (Linda LeMoncheck and James P. Sterba, Eds.) Oxford, Oxford University
Press (2001).    
 A very recent case provides just the sort of conundrum that Judge Stephens feared.  The Ninth Circuit Court70
of Appeals reversed summary judgment in a case involving a male employee (Lamas) who alleged that a female
colleague (Munoz) created a hostile work environment that lead to his poor performance and termination, finding that
the district court was wrong to assume that a “reasonable man” would not consider being constantly propositioned for
sex by a female colleague to be discriminatory.  EEOC v. Prospect Airport Services, Inc., 2010 WL 3448119, *4 (9th
Cir. 2010).  Lamas, recently a widower and an adherent to traditional Christian precepts about sex, was subjected to
numerous propositions by a married co-worker (including some communicated through co-employees) that the company
refused to address.  The court rejected the significance of Lamas admitting that most men in his circumstance would have
welcomed the sexual advances by Munoz, finding that it was based on a stereotype of men and that “welcomeness” must
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woman” standard concrete.  Judge Stephens clearly worries that the new standard will simply
be a vehicle for unarticulated pop psychology regarding gender differences.
It takes no stretch of the imagination to envision two complaints emanating
from the same workplace regarding the same conditions, one brought by a woman
and the other by a man.  Application of the “new standard” presents a puzzlement
which is born of the assumption that men’s eyes do not see what a woman sees
through her eyes.  I find it surprising that the majority finds no need for evidence on
any of these subjects.  I am not sure whether the majority also concludes that the
woman and the man in question are also reasonable without evidence on this subject.
I am irresistibly drawn to the view that the conditions of the workplace itself should
be examined as affected, among other things, by the conduct of the people working
there as to whether the workplace as existing is conducive to fulfilling the goals of
Title VII.  In any event, these are unresolved factual issues which preclude summary
judgment.68
Certainly, such evidence is available and should be offered at trial.   But Judge Stephens is69
correct to note that this line of proof may undermine the equality principle of Title VII by
suggesting that the problem is not with the workplace environment, but rather by the different
attitudes of women to the same environment that men would find acceptable.70
be determined by a mostly subjective standard.  The court reasons:
Title VII is not a beauty contest, and even if Munoz looks like Marilyn Monroe, Lamas might not want
to have sex with her, for all sorts of possible reasons.  He might feel that fornication is wrong, and that
adultery is wrong as is supported by his remark about being a Christian.  He might fear her husband.
He might fear a sexual harassment complaint or other accusation if her feelings about him changed.
He might fear complication in his workday.  He might fear that his preoccupation with his deceased
wife would take any pleasure out of it.  He might just not be attracted to her.  He may fear eighteen
years of child support payments.  He might feel that something was mentally off about a woman that
sexually aggressive toward him.  Some men might feel that chivalry obligates a man to say yes, but
the law does not.
Id. at *5.  This analysis is bizarre, because the unwelcome character of the advances was manifestly clear in this case.
As the court notes, if Munoz had propositioned Lamas and taken “no” for an answer, there would be no basis for
permitting the lawsuit to continue.  Id. at *6.  The real issue in the case under the analytical structure of the “reasonable
woman” standard is whether the unwelcome and persistent propositioning for sexual relations is such that a “reasonable
man,” and not necessarily a recent widower with traditional religious sentiments, would justifiably regard the workplace
as hostile on account of sex.
Unlike a reasonable woman who may be fearful of the possibility of sexual assault, feel insecure about her place
in a male-dominated work environment, and then must endure sexual provocations designed to subordinate her status
in the workplace, the court might reasonably conclude that a reasonable man might simply continue to say “no” to
persistent propositions and get back to work.  The court avoids this conclusion by considering the plaintiff’s subjective
(and presumably atypical) characteristics as part of its analysis of the unwelcomeness of the conduct.  But the mistake
in the court’s approach is to focus on the gendered “reasonable” response to a sexual overture in the first place.  The real
gravamen of Lamas’s complaint is that many of his co-workers subjected him “to constant ridicule and taunting,” mocked
“him for his failure to respond to Munoz’s sexual advances,” and even began speculating that he was gay.  Id. at *7, *3.
In other words, the court’s focus on the gendered nature of reactions to sexual overtures reveals questionable assumptions
and generalizations about men and women; even worse, the court’s approach totally occludes the gender discrimination
at work in the harassing treatment of Lamas for not being “man enough.”  This case requires the kind of analysis of
subordination on the basis of gender stereotypes provided in McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 49, in order
to understand the nature of the hostile work environment faced by Lamas.
 Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of Loss, 47 VAND . L. REV.71
427, 429 (1994).
 Beginning with the principle that from “an efficiency perspective, it is only worthwhile to allocate loss through72
the judicial system to the extent that the costs of doing so do not outweigh the benefits,” id. at 460, Reilly contends that
the reactions of a supposed “reasonable woman” to workplace conditions cannot be accepted without weighing the costs
of deviating from a social consensus that includes the views of both reasonable men and reasonable women.
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In this posture, the focus of investigation quickly becomes the atypical response of
women to workplace situations.  In short, the “reasonable woman” may be respected, but she
is portrayed as unreasonable!  This leads to retrograde analyses that confound the very
purpose of Title VII.  For example, Marie Reilly engages in a sophistic effort to import
econometrics to render decisionmaking more certain, arguing that feminist scholars seeking
to change social norms to prevent discrimination luxuriously “ignore entirely the social cost
of such a social restructuring.”   This amounts to a thinly veiled conclusion that the71
unpredictable (which is to say, unreasonable from the perspective of the established social
consensus) responses of reasonable women are too costly for the business world to take
account of in structuring the workplace.   Reilly’s underlying focus is the responsiveness to72
Practical application of the paradigm to workplace sexual conduct reveals more the absence of a social
consensus than the existence of one.  Individual tastes regarding sexual conduct vary widely and
conclusions about what a “reasonable person” or even a “reasonable woman” would find offensive or
harmless in a given situation are precarious.  Even so, for some sexual conduct, like that which
constitutes “quid pro quo harassment,” consensus is relatively strong.  In contrast, for some, but not
all, so-called “hostile work environment harassment,” there currently may be no consensus.  In the
absence of a social consensus regarding the costs and benefits of challenged conduct, there is no
assurance that reallocating loss will yield an efficiency gain sufficient to offset the considerable
administrative costs of adjudicating the dispute.  In such cases, the optimal loss allocation rule is not
to intervene at all.
. . . .
The current scholarship ignores the fact that loss from sexual conduct is a product of the interaction
between men and women.  Writers refer to the complaining woman as the “victim” and the defendant
as the “injurer.”  But a woman is no more a victim of a man’s crude remarks than a man is the victim
of the woman’s sensitivity to them.  Scholarship that characterizes defendants in sexual harassment
cases as “injurers” and plaintiffs as “victims” presupposes an ethic under which plaintiff’s values
morally trump those of defendants.
Id. at 431-32, 435.
 Reilly betrays her ideological leaning by offering a hypothetical case of a co-worker asking a woman on a73
date!  Id. at 461.  Given the highly offensive work conditions challenged by women under the reasonable woman
standard, this example is clearly off the mark.  However, given the nature of the complaint in the ground-breaking Ellison
case, raising the differential experience of a reasonable woman to the bizarre and irrational actions of a co-worker
persistently seeking a relationship, it is understandable that this example is misunderstood to be the legitimate paradigm
of sexual harassment.
 It is important to recognize that the system of power in the American workplace is also structured along lines74
of race, ethnicity, social class, and other deep fault lines in modern society.  Courts should not be overly reductive in
analyzing everything in terms of gender discrimination. 
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sexual situations in the workplace, which fairly tracks the use of the “reasonable woman”
standard by courts.  Although lacking an appreciation that civil rights statutes are not, and
should not, be judged according to rules of economic efficiency, Reilly does highlight that
reactions to sexual situations in the workplace are probably more ambiguous and multivalent
than is assumed by the proponents of the “reasonable woman” standard.73
The solution to these potential difficulties is to unhinge the rhetoric of the “reasonable
woman” from an analysis of the severity or pervasiveness of (sexual) behavior in the
workplace, and to employ a gender-sensitive standard to determine the very nature of sexual
harassment discrimination.  Working from theoretical critiques of the system of privilege that
is, in part,  gendered, drawing from socio-legal research that explains how the system is74
replicated in the American workplace, and moving beyond the law’s seeming fascination
with protecting “reasonable women” with refined sensibilities from a sexualized workplace,
will greatly broaden the scope of inquiry but may also prove to lend itself to more effective
and consistent judicial resolution.  The “reasonable woman” would no longer be a construct
of the fragile female thrust from the safe confines of the home into a hurly-burly and coarse
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blue-collar workplace.  Instead, the rhetoric of the “reasonable woman” standard would seek
to uncover the systemic problems facing women in the workplace, which are regularly,
although certainly not exclusively, manifested in the sexualization of the workplace to a
degree that hinders the full and effective participation of many women in that workplace. 
E. Conclusion: The Rhetorical Evolution of the Reasonable Woman Standard
I have described how the effort to eradicate gender discrimination in the American
workplace led to the adoption of a “hostile work environment” theory of discrimination,
which then posed a central problem for courts: How can a court assess when a workplace is
offensive on the basis of gender?  The easiest situations were addressed in the EEOC
guidelines dealing with problems of sexual desire harming the opportunities for women in
the workplace, but even this insight was not without problems or questions.  If a workplace
manager is an inept Cyrano who asks a subordinate out on a date, should that lead to liability
for the employer?  Recognizing that a male perspective might undervalue the harms caused
by certain behavior, courts have adopted a “reasonable woman standard” to provide context
for assessing the severity and pervasiveness of the behavior in question.
I have urged that we push the rhetoric of anti-discrimination further in this context,
such that the very nature of discrimination would be assessed with a “reasonable woman”
standard that seeks to identify hostile work environments that subordinate women in a
manner that may not be apparent to a “reasonable man” who takes status quo inequities for
granted.  This means that some woman might be untroubled by a workplace that is deemed
discriminatory against women, but the focus on the “reasonable” character of the test would
require plaintiffs to demonstrate through sound empirical and theoretical methods that the
workplace instantiates gendered stereotypes that interfere with the ability of many women
to succeed in that workplace.
One might plausibly respond that every workplace – indeed, every element of civil
society – is tainted by discriminatory prejudice.  This response is true, but misses the mark.
The goal of Title VII, despite the flowery aspirational claims, is not to eliminate any and all
manner of discrimination on the basis of gender; this is quite simply an impossible task.  The
goal is to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex “with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.”  In the context of “hostile work environment” sex
discrimination, the question should be whether the workplace environment is such that a
reasonable woman would not be able to secure the same compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment” as a reasonable man.  This inquiry undertakes a much more far-
reaching and sophisticated task than merely determining if sexual advances or sexualized
behavior is so severe or pervasive that a reasonable woman would suffer discrimination.
Expanding the “reasonable woman” standard to assess the initial question of whether the
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behavior or policies in question are hostile on the basis of gender raises a host of practical
questions, but these questions are inevitable if we fully embrace the evolving rhetorical
construction of our commitment to a workplace free of gender discrimination.
